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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a suit brought by the guardian of c

arna Peter!
plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as a p p e 11 an t ) , tc
vacate a deed on the basis of said person's alleged in competan '
1
and of alleged undue influence exercised over her by the d
efantt
respondents (hereinafter referred to as respondents) at th .
e t1:
of execution of her warranty deed to respondents.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After having heard the evidence and arguments of
counsel, and having taken the matter under advisement, the
court ruled that the appellant herein failed to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence the invalidity of the

warren~,

dead dated September 2, 1975, by which respondents acquired
subject property.

Based primarily upon the testimony of milto·

T. Harmon, Esq., the court found that the grantor in said deac
knew and understood the nature of the transaction, the lien
position of the State of Utah, and the consequential limitatio1
on benefits to be derived by her from a sale of her property,
The court further ruled that the evidence did not

s~

that the respondents defrauded the grantor or the state of

u~

over-reached, exerted duress or undue influence, or otherwise
committed any unlawful act in negotiating for and

acq~iring

said property.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization (provided
1) by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

STATEmENT OF FACTS
In 1972, it came to the knowledge of the respondents
that mrs. Peterson wanted them to have her home.

After

extensive groundwork had been laid respondents were told that
mrs. Peterson had changed her mind.

Her family disapproved of

the sale. (R.l62)
Sometime later mrs. Peterson moved from her home to
her daughter Anna's and several months later to the Colonial
manor Resthome in Nephi, Utah.

The home in question was left

vacant from 1973 to September 1975.

Its condition became

generally run down. (R.209)
Along in August of 1975 respondents were egein contacted
and told that mrs. Peterson wanted them to coma in end sea her
because her house was deteriorating, no one was living in it,
her garden wasn't being taken care of end she wanted to go
ahead with the sale. (R.l7l)

Before visiting mrs. Paterson,

respondents contacted Larry Broadhead, (later appointed mrs.
Paterson's guardian), to tell him what mrs. Peterson wanted and
that respondents didn't went any hard feelings or any problems
with mrs. Peterson's family.

Larry Broadhead said that he had

no objections end that he wouldn't become involved with it.(R.l7l,
172).
Upon respondent's request, milton Harmon, Esq., end
Dave Gowers, the state Welfare agent, met with mrs. Peterson
and explained what financial implications the sale would have.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
(2)
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

milton Harmon was acquainted with mrs

•

Pete

• f
.
rson s
am~ly end

had represented them on previous occasions. (R.l73) After meet
with Mrs. Peterson, Mr. Hermon called Anna Broadhead, mrs,
Peterson's closest living relative, to inform her of the Pla~
to purchase the property and to ask if there were

b·
any o Jecta

Anna celled Mr. Hermon back to inform him that she thought it
would be best to sell the property.

(R.Bl)

On the following day, September 2, 197S, Mil ton Hermc
brought the deed to the resthome and mrs. Peterson conveyed tn,
subject property to the respondents.

At that time the state

Welfare Department had a lien on the property and intended to
give mrs. Peterson Sl,OOD.DO for any sale of the property for
her funeral expenses.

The remainder would go to the State to

release their lien.
Sherman Peterson was requested by the State to apprai
the value of the land.
S3,2DO.OD.

(R.210)

(R.209)

He quoted the state a figure c

The respondents paid the appraisal figure

and the State released its lien on the 70 year old, four room
home.

( R. 107)
After conveyance of the deed, respondents set about

to repair the home,

first they replumbed the entire house.

Then they put in new floors,

lowered the ceiling, paneled wal.

repaired window and door frames, painted, rewired, aug a new
cesspool (R.lB7), cleaned out old trees and fences, hauled oN
garbage (R.lBB).

On November 22, 1975 respondents were notif:

of a pending action against them.

They immediately ceased wo:.

( 3)
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on their home, as thai

·
r investment in time and money was

considerable.
On the 19th of December, 1975, Larry Broadhead brought
suit as newly appointed guardian for mrs. Peterson.
He alleged
that mrs. Peterson was incompetent at the t·
1me of the transaction,
that she had received less than full considerat 1· 0 n for the property,
and that the respondents had exercised undue influence over mrs.
Peterson.

On the 29th of July, 1976, over seven months later,

the state of Utah intervened.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents on
the validity of the deed because appellant failed to establish
his allegations by a prepon9erance of the evidence.

The court

also found no undue influence or any unlawful act in negotiating
for the property, and that respondents were not guilty of defrauding the grantor or the state of utah.
ARGUmENT
POINT NO.
THIS COURT, SITTING IN EQUITY, SHOULD NOT DISTURB
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT BUT SHOULD SUSTAIN THEm AS
A PROPER APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE ESTABLISHED FACTS.
In en action to cancel a deed executed by an alleged
mental incompetent, or one allegedly mentally weakened and
acting under undue influence, the presumption is in favor of the
correctness of the judgment of the trial court and the Supreme
court end the Supreme court will not disturb the findings of
the trial court unless they ere against the clear weight of
evidence.

mathews v. Pederson, 204 Okl. 687, 133 P.2d 971(1951).
(4)
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The credibility of witnesses and weight of

evidence in such
a case is for the trial judge who sees and hears the witnessl
to determine.

Wilson v. Sampson, 91 Cal.App.2nd 9

53, 205

P,;

753 (1949}.
"The Supreme Court assumes that the trial court

bali

those aspects of the evidence which support h1s
· Findings and
judgment." Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 19?7),
Cornia v. Cornia, 80 Utah 486, 15 P.2d 631 (1932).

The evide

in this case on appeal should be viewed in light most favorab
to sustaining the lower court. Brown v. Board of Ed uca t·1on~
morgen co. School Dist., 560 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1977), cutler v,
Bowen, 10 Cal. App. 2d 31, 51 P.2d 164 (1935).
POINT NO. II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE GRANTOR HM
SUFFICIENT MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF EXECUTION OF THE ~
a,

Test of Capacity
Whether in property law or in Contract law the test

is the same concerning the mental capacity of one who conveys
property or contracts with another.

It has been stated in

Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945):
"The test whether grantor has sufficient mental
capacity to make a deed is: were mental facilities
so deficient or impaired that there was not sufficient power to comprehend the subject or the deed, it:
nature, and its probable consequences, and to act
with discretion in relation thereto, or with reletim
to ordinary affairs of life?"
See also Hatch v. Hatch, 46 utah 218, 148 P. 433 (1914), matt1
of woodward, 549 P.2d 1207 (Okl. 1976), and Armstrong v. Andn
4 7 1 p • 2 d 3 2 6 ( ok 1 • 19 6 6 ) •

By this test the tria 1 court was ci

correct in determining carne Peterson competent to execute

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
warranty deed.
(5)
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t~

During the time period 1'n

h' h the transaction occurred

W lC

mrs. Peterson coherently expressed her purposes 1·n selling the
property. She wanted respondents to have the home because:
l.

She didn't intend to return there (R.77),

2.

She had worked with them on selling the home at

e prior ocassion, but it had not come about (R.77),
3.

She "thought a lot of these people" (R.77),

4.

She wanted someone to have the home that would

live in it (R.l74),
5.

None of her family needed it (R.l74).

These statements give great weight to the proposition that mrs.
Peterson had sufficient power to comprehend what she was doing.
mrs. Peterson also asked the following questions end
was advised accordingly:

1.

would her welfare support be terminated upon sale

of the home?

This question was answered by mr. Gowers,

from the state Welfare Department.

He told her if she

did sell the home, support would not be termineted. (R.77)
2.

What would happen to the money that came from the

home? (mrs. Peterson, acknowledging that she had given
the Welfare Department a lien on the home, was concerned
as to what would happen because of the lien,)

This

question was also answered by mr. Gowers, as he advised
her that she would receive the first thousand dollars
to go into a trust to be used for her burial, the balance
of the proceeds of the sale would go to the welfare
Department. (R.7B)

To this answer mrs. Peterson immed-

responded
question
#3.
Sponsored by theiately
S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Fundingwith
for digitization
provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services
(6) by the Utah State Library.
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3.

Whst about the money that 111uu ld go 1nto the trus

This question mrs. Peterson asked of milton Harmon,
Attorney at Law.

She obviously understood that he

an attorney and that he 1110uld know about such matte

.

~c:

rs.

mr. Harmon advised her that she would not be able to
spend it end it would go to a bank and be in trust by
soma other member of the family.

(R.78).

Clearly mrs. Peterson understood the probable conseque·.
of her decision to sell her home.

By her comments and question,

she displayed the ability to interact effectively in this trans.
action "and to act with discretion in relation thereto."
v. Thomes, supra.
confronted with the fact that some in her family might

1

not approve of the sale and if she was sure she wanted to go
through with it, she replied that "Anne didn't want her to sell
the property, but it was her property and she 111as going to do
with it what she wanted to do with it end she wanted to sell it'
to mr. carter." (R.78)

mrs. Peterson was obviously aware of the

consequences of the sale es to her family relations and also of
her right as the owner of the property to dispose of it as she
saw f i t .
The day of the conveyance, upon affirmance that she
still wanted to sell the property, mrs. Peterson told milton
Harmon, Exq., who was conducting the transaction, that she
trusted him and expected that the $1,000.00 for her burial woulo
be administered properly.

(R.84)

mrs. Peterson herein shows her

(7)
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ability to understand the weighty metter of her funeral expenses
and administration at the actual time of the conveyance of the
deed.
In the opinion of milton Harmon, Esq., as to mrs.
Peterson's competency to sign the deed, "there was no question
in my mind that she knew whet she was doing and she wanted the
home to go to mr. and mrs. Carter." (R.86)
Respondents respectfully submit that mrs. Peterson
had the necessary capacity at the time of the execution of the
deed to convey her property.
b.

Prior and Subsequent Evidence
In the leading case of Tate v. murphy, 202 Okl. 671,

217

P.2d 177, 18 ALR.2d 892 (1950), the court settled the basic

issues involved in the case at Bar.

One point that was determined

by the Court was that while evidence of mantel capacity prior
and subsequent to the transaction was admissable, evidence of
mental capacity at the

!~mediate

time is controlling.

See also

Estey v. Haughian, 112 mont. 36, 113 P.2d 325 (1941), and mathews
v. Pederson, supra.

At trial, in addition to witnesses for

respondents testifying of mrs. Peterson's coherent conversations;
five of the appellant's witnesses acknowledged that mrs. Peterson
did have lucid intervals and intermittent times in which she
carried on conversations end, understood what was going on. (R.57,
65,118,130,183)

All except one of the appellant's witnesses that

knew mrs. peterson testified as to her general condition prior
and subsequent to the actual time the deed was executed.

This

(B)
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evidence, submitted for the proposition that mrs. Peterson w

Bs

incompetent at the time the deed was execu t e d , was f ound lacki,
in weight by the trial court; as was her own testimony et trie,
some two years after the actual act.
c.

Lucid Intervals
Tate v. murphy, supra, also sets forth an applicable

ruling on capacity to convey a deed when a person of years
be known to have incompetent moments.

mey

The court states:

"A person of week mentality whose incompetence has not
been judicially determined may be capable of executin
a valid conveyance or other contract during lucid in(
vals in which he is capable of understanding the net:
and effect of his act, even though he is weak from a!:'
age and physical infirmities, may be irrational at t~
and changeable in his views upon certain subjects, em
may suffer eccentric hallucinations and express irret 1j
views when sick and under the influence of sedatives,'
This ruling allows for a rather

~ide

range of infirmities as

discussed by the appellant's witnesses and still the subject
may have the necessary capacity during a lucid interval to
a deed.

ax~

In the matter of woodward, Supra, another long list

infirmities of the grantor is ruled out as conclusive of
ency at the time of conveyance of a deed.

ol

inca~

The court ruled that

the testimony of isolated instances of failing memory, testin
of forgetfulness and wandering of mind, testimony that the

gr~

was untidy, appearing confused and vague, even physicians' test,
that the grantor was afflicted with a chronic brain syndrome oi
senility were all insufficient to warrant setting aside the

~

for lack of mental capacity at the time of the conveyance.

T~

court further stated that "the law does not require the
of a deed to be completely competent."

gran~

The grantor is only

{9)
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required to pass the test of capacity: the grantor must have
the ability to understand the nature and effect of the act at
the time the conveyance is made.

Burgess v. colby, g3 utah 103,

71 P.2d 185 (1937).
The policy for this is obvious,

If an elderly person

showed signs of incompetency in any way, their estate would soon
be subject to disposition by someone else regardless of recovery
of health, because i t could always be proven that at some time
the subject was incompetent.
to swallow.

This would be a rather hard pill

The rule of competency at the time of the conveyance

allows for the many people that recover from their illnesses, or
that experience coherent times in between, to still exercise
their right to dispose of their property as they see fit.
The respondents respectfully submit that mrs. Peterson
by her own instigation of the sale and by her questions, conversation, and statements shows her capacity at the time of the
conveyance as required by the test in Anderson v. Thomas, Supra.
d.

Procedure
It muat be remembered that incapacity to make a deed

should be established by a preponderance of the evidence or by
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.
Supra, Armstrong v. Anderson, Supra.

Tate v. murphy,

In an action to set aside

a deed on grounds of lack of mental capacity of the

~rantor,

the presumption is that the grantor had mental capacity to execute
the deed and the burden of proof is upon the party attacking the
validity of the deed.

matter of woodward, Supra, Wilson v.

Sampson, Supra, Westover v. Harris, 47 N.m.ll2, 137 P.2d 177(1943),
(10)
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Higgins

v. Pipkin, 360 P.2d 231 (Okl. 1961), Hackett v. HackE

429 P.2d 753 (Okl. 1967).

As stated by the trial court, this

burden of proof was not met.
POINT NO. III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY fOUND THERE llikS NO UNDUE
INfLUENCE OVER MRS. PETERSON.
Appellant has alleged that because respondent's

gran~

mother and mrs. Peterson were friends there was suspicion of
undue influence.

During trial, evidence was found lacking in

weight to support this allegation.

The court in Anderson v.

Thomas, Supra, held:
"In suit to cencel a deed for undue influence,
Plaintiff must show that grantee exercised a
domineting influence over grantor and thus induced grantor to execute the deed and merely
raising suspiciion of such influence would not
be sufficient."
There was no proof that respondents at any time
a dominating influence over the grantor".

Indeed, during the

conveyance mrs. Peterson spoke quite freely. (R.B4)
was there to oversee the transaction.

"axe~

An attorn1

"Undue influence must

established by clear and convincing evidence."
Rasmussen, 16 utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965).

b1

Bradbury v.
In light of tl

fact that permission had been received from mrs. Peterson's
family to sell, why would undue influence be necessary?

Since

mrs. Paterson had instigated the sale and would only receive
$1,006.00 for her funeral expenses, how would undue influence.
serve the respondents?

Indeed, the allegation is inconsistent

with the facts.
Appellant has also alleged that between mrs. Peterson
there may have been a confidential relationsh~
11) by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization (provided
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~espondents
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However, even relatlonships of parent and child do not constitute
evidence of such confidential relationship as to create a preaumption of fraud or undue influence.
supre.

Bradbury v. Rasmussen,

Confidential relationships must be proven.
Appellant suggests that consideration was nominal and

proof of undue influence.

However, the respondents relied on

the figure quoted by the State appraiser, as did the State Welfare
Department.

They were not asked to PllY more than the $3,200.00

appraisal; they were merely asked to pay the appraisal figure.
According to 23 Am JUR 2d Deeds Sec 66, Et seq. "any
valuable consideration, even a nominal sum of money, is sufficient
as between the parties and their privies, to render a deed operative
to pass title to property."
Where friendship has been shown to exist between buyer
and seller it is certainly plausible that the seller may sell
for a good price.

But, even "love and affection are valid

consideration for the execution of a dead." Crumley v. Smith,
397 P.2d 119 (Okl. 1964), Pailhe v. Pailhe, 247 P.2d B3B
(Cal. App. 1952).
Respondents respectfully submit that appellant has not
shown undue influence by the weight of evidence.
POINT NO.

i-V

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW APPELLANT TO mAINTAIN A
VEXATIOUS SUIT IN WHICH HE HAS NO STANDING AND IS NOT THE REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST.
To enable one to maintain an action to enforce private
rights, he must show that he has sustained some injury to his
personal or property rights, and he must show that he will be
(12)
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benefited by the relief granted.

state ex rel. Gebardt v,

Superior Court for King Co., 15 Wash. 2d 673, 131 P.2d 943
(1942), State ex rel. Harp v. Wilson, 17 wash. 670,137 P.2d
105 (1943).

An action which is merely vexatious, or which is

unnecessary and cannot produce any practical results ordinarii
cannot be maintained.

l CJS Actions Sec. 21.

Respondents contend that thts is merely a vexatious
claim from which the appellant will receive no benefit.

The

only purpose for rescinding the sale will be to give mrs. Pate·

·:

family a chance to purchase the property themselves.

This sui:

is not being brought in the name of mrs. Peterson's family,
however. It is to rescind a sale of mrs. Peterson's home for

n•
..:0

As mrs. Peterson had foreseen, she will need to be cared for a:
a resthome and it would be very unlikely she would ever use
property again.
action? Nothing.

~

Therefore, what can mrs. Peterson gain in thi:
She has already disposed of the property as

she desired and she has received all that she can monetarily
receive regardless of who the purchaser may be.

Her practical

results for bringing this suit are of no benefit to her.
It has been common to courts of equity for years that '
actions must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.

59 AM JUR 2d Real Party in Interest Sec. 38 Et seq ..

The real party in interest provisions are intended to bring bai:
the court the party rightfully interested in the litigatioo, u
that only real controversies will be presented and the judgment
when entered, will be binding and conclusive, and so the dsfeu
will be saved from further harassment or vexation at the hands
of other claimants.

Anheuser-Bush, Inc. v. Starley, :LB Cal.2d,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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347, 170 P.2d 448, 166 ALR 198 (1946), Caughey v. George Jenson
end Sons, 74 Idaho 132, 258 P.2d 357 (1953).
Respondents submit that the only real party in interest
is the State of Utah (Welfare Department).

The State intervened

at trial because it would make a difference to them how much
the property sold for.

If the sale is rescinded and the property

resold for e higher price, the State is the only party that can
receive benefit.

Therefore, the state is the only party that

has standing and a valid interest in the proceedings.

mrs.

Peterson has received all that she will ever receive from the
sale of the land and house.
Respondents respectfully submit that the appellant is
maintaining a vexatious suit end is not the real party in interest.
STATE Of UTAH
The State of Utah accepted their appraiser's figure
of 53,200.00 for the property, and upon payment by respondents,
released their lien on the property. (R.l76)

The State of Utah

cannot now claim that they have not received adequate money for
the release of their lien.
CONCLUSION
Upon a review of the facts of this case, the Court
should sustain the trial judge's findings that mrs. Peterson
k11ew and understood the nature of the transaction and the conseqJences derived by her from a sale of the property.

The evidence

of the proceedings during the actual time of the conveyance
supports this conclusion.

The Court should elsa sustain the trial

judge's findings that the evidence did not show the respondents
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exerted undue influence, duress, or committed any unlawful
act in negotiating for and acquiring subject property.
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of

November

~flF

2---ee-

DliV9CiiiUin,
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
City Office Bldg.
P.O. Box 176
Payson, Utah 84651

MAILING CERTIFICATE
mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondents
to John L. Valentine, for Howard, Lewis & Petersen,l20 East
300 North, Provo, Utah 84601 and to mr. Steven Schwendiman,
Attorney for Intervenor, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this ~ day of

, 1977.
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